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Highlights
•	 Electricity	 industries	 have	 evolved	 to	 ensure	 fair	 competition,	 higher	 effi-
ciency,	declining	prices	and	reliability	of	operation.	The	Brazilian	electricity	
market	is	characterised	by	having	around	75%	of	installed	capacity	coming	
from	renewables,	and	has	gone	through	two	reforms	in	recent	years.	Nowa-
days,	it	contains	certain	particularities	that	distinguish	it	from	other	markets.
•	 Nevertheless,	 the	 conciliation	 between	 commercial	 commitments	 and	 the	
physical	dispatch	is	not	smooth.	There	is	a	lack	of	“trading	opportunities”	to	
encourage	participants	to	comply	with	their	contracts.	Moreover,	the	Brazil-
ian	short-term	market	acts	as	a	mechanism	to	settle	differences	rather	than	
a	true	market	and,	neither	the	short-term	price	nor	the	dispatch	schedule	is	
determined	by	the	market.
•	 If	a	more	market-	oriented	approach	is	to	be	adopted,	certain	dilemmas	have	
to	be	faced.	This	brief	describes	a	new	market	framework,	aimed	at	enhanc-
ing	flexibility	to	enable	participants	to	sustain	their	contracts,	while	ensuring	
the	efficient	use	of	the	energy	resources	and	maintaining	the	current	level	of	
the	security	of	supply.
•	 In	this	new	market	design,	two	worlds	would	coexist:	the	real	one,	associated	
with	the	power	system	and	with	physical	effects;	and	the	virtual	one,	related	to	
the	settlement	system	and	with	commercial	effects.	By	doing	so,	the	ISO	can	
physically	operate	the	power	system	in	an	optimised	way,	and	generators	can	
manage	their	contracts	strongly	supported	by	their	level	of	risk	perception.
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Introduction 
Several	countries	embarked	on	a	path	characterised	by	market	
liberalisation,	 in	order	 to	 implement	decentralised	 and	 com-
petitive	structures.	Brazil	presents	a	continental	interconnected	
transmission	system	with	a	growing	demand	and	with	a	total	
generation	installed	capacity	of	around	135	GW	(around	70%	
comes	 from	 hydropower	 plants),	 and	 having	 gone	 through	
two	 large	 institutional	 reforms	 in	 the	 last	 twenty	 years.	The	
first	reform	promoted	a	transition	from	the	vertical	integrated	
utility	 structure	 to	 a	market	where	 agents	 could	 freely	nego-
tiate	 contracts.	 Nevertheless,	 driven	 by	 an	 aggressive	 energy	
rationing	programme	experienced	from	June	2001	to	February	
2002,	the	second	reform	restored	certain	fundamentals/	princi-
ples	and	added	some	new	guidelines:
A.	Reintroduction	of	the	long-term	centralised	planning	con-
ducted	by	the	federal	government	to	address	the	security	of	
supply.	Thus,	the	expansion	of	the	system	doesn’t	rely	on	a	
market-based	approach;
B.	 Implementation	of	 long-term	contracts	 (PPAs)	with	 avail-
ability	of	payment.	The	goal	was	to	promote	the	installation	
of	thermal	power	plants;
C.	Requirement	 that	 consumers	 must	 be	 fully	 supplied	 by	
energy	and	power	purchase	contracts,	and	all	contracts	must	
be	 registered	with	 the	 Brazilian	market	 operator	 (CCEE).	
Distribution	 utilities	 and	 free	 consumers	must	 ensure	 the	
compliance	of	100%	of	their	consumptions;
D.	Requirement	 that	sellers	must	have	enough	capacity	when	
selling	energy	and	power	 to	entirely	 implement	 their	con-
tracts.	 In	 other	words,	 all	 sold	 electricity	 should	 be	 100%	
physically	backed.	This	“physical	coverage	for	sale”	consists	
of	what	 is	known	as	the	“physical	guarantee”	of	the	power	
plants.	In	the	long-	term,	the	physical	guarantee	represents	
the	amount	of	electricity	that	can	be	continuously	produced;	
and
E.	Creation	of	two	contracting	environments:	the	ACR	-	Reg-
ulated	 Contracting	 Environment	 (single	 buyer	 model),	
encompassing	 around	 70%	 of	 the	market,	 and	 the	ACL	 -	
Free	 Contracting	 Environment	 (competition	 in	 the	 retail	
market),	with	 30%.	 In	 the	ACR,	 prices	 are	 determined	 by	
national	public	auctions	conducted	by	the	government	(one	
of	 the	main	 targets	of	 this	 scheme	 is	 to	provide	affordable	
tariffs	to	the	growing	economy)	while	in	the	ACL	prices	are	
freely	negotiated.
Despite	 these	 changes,	 the	 short-term	market	 price	 is	 not	 a	
result	of	the	market	participant’s	interactions,	and	the	dispatch	
is	performed	 in	a	centralised	way	by	 the	 ISO,	 such	 that	gen-
eration	companies	are	not	allowed	to	decide	their	own	genera-
tion	 in	order	 to	comply	with	their	contracts.	 In	addition,	 the	
mechanism	implemented	in	order	to	share	the	risk	of	not	being	
dispatched	 does	 not	 allow	 generators	 to	 develop	 their	 own	
strategy	according	to	their	risk	perception.
In	this	brief,	we	discuss	the	problems	and	dilemmas	that	have	
to	 be	 confronted,	 if	 a	 more	 conventional	 market-	 oriented	
approach	 is	 to	be	adopted	 in	Brazil.	Moreover,	we	propose	a	
market	design	aimed	at	enhancing	flexibility	to	enable	market	
participants	to	maintain	their	contracts,	while	still	ensuring	the	
efficient	use	of	energy	resources	and	maintaining	the	current	
level	of	the	security	of	supply.
Remarkable features of the Brazilian 
Electricity Market
Seasonalisation process
After	 closing	 a	 contract	 and	when	 the	 power	 plant	 becomes	
available,	market	participants	 can	perform	a	 seasonal	 adjust-
ment	of	 the	contracted	energy	and	of	 the	physical	guarantee,	
respectively.	This	process	 is	called	“seasonalisation”	which,	 in	
other	words,	allows	once	a	year	the	distribution	of	the	annual	
energy	committed	in	monthly	MWh	packages.
ISO dispatch procedure
Instead	 of	 a	market-based	 approach,	 the	 dispatch	 is	 defined	
based	on	the	solution	of	a	minimum	operational	cost	problem	
that	 seeks	 a	 trade-off	 between	 saving	 water	 now	 and	 using	
thermal	fuel	(if	the	expectation	of	inflows	is	low),	or	using	water	
now	and	saving	 thermal	 fuel	 (if	 the	expectation	of	 inflows	 is	
favourable).	The	optimal	dispatch	problem	is	currently	solved	
through	 a	 stochastic	 dynamic	 and	 linear	 programming	 soft-
ware	package.	The	opportunity	water	 value	 is	one	of	 the	key	
elements	of	this	model	and	it	 is	set	to	examine,	among	other	
issues,	 the	 forecasted	 hydrology	 and	 demand.	The	 two	main	
outputs	are:	the	dispatch	schedule	of	the	power	plants;	and	the	
short-term	market	prices,	well-known	as	PLD	(Price	of	the	Dif-
ferences	Settlement).	Both	of	them	are	established	weekly	for	
three	daily	load	steps.
Mechanism for Reallocation of Energy
Since	the	dispatch	is	performed	in	a	centralised	way	by	the	ISO	
without	considering	the	contracted	energy,	the	Mechanism	for	
Reallocation	of	Energy	 (MRE)	 is	 then	 activated.	The	MRE	 is	
applied	to	hydros	that	committed	to	deliver	a	certain	amount	
of	electricity	(MWh)	during	a	specific	period,	at	a	pre-defined	
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price	1.	The	goal	of	this	mechanism	is	to	cover	the	risk	of	gen-
erators	 having	 to	 buy	 electricity	 in	 the	 short-term	market	 at	
PLD	to	account	for	the	amount	of	energy	committed	in	their	
contracts.	Briefly,	the	MRE	reallocates	energy,	transferring	the	
surplus	generated	from	those	that	produce	beyond	their	phys-
ical	guarantee	to	those	that	produce	below.
Short-term market 
The	short-term	market	(also	called	MCP)	 is	used	to	make	all	
settlements.	Once	all	closed	contracts	have	 to	be	recorded	 in	
CCEE,	the	CCEE	measures	the	amounts	that	were	actually	pro-
duced	/	consumed	by	each	agent.	After	applying	the	MRE,	the	
differences	between	contracted	energy	and	the	verified	energy	
are	 accounted	 for,	 and	 the	 exposed	 positions	 are	 valued	 at	
the	PLD.	Their	own	production	(power	plants	 just	 follow	the	
dispatch	order	of	the	ISO)	plus	the	energy	allocated	from	the	
MRE	(which	depends	on	the	seasonalised	physical	guarantee)	
is	equal	to	the	verified	energy.	Then,	the	verified	energy	is	com-
pared	with	the	contracted	energy,	and	the	resulting	difference	
is	settled	in	the	MCP	at	PLD.	This	settlement	process,	as	illus-
trated	in	Figure	1,	is	performed	on	a	monthly	basis.
Problems
Problem 1
In	 this	 current	 market	 design,	 the	 conciliation	 between	 the	
commercial	commitments	of	the	market	participants	and	the	
physical	dispatch	is	not	easily	accomplished.	In	Brazil	there	is	
no	 balancing	market;	 neither	 intraday	 or	 day-ahead	 options,	
nor	 future	markets.	 Instead,	 there	 is	 an	 annual	 “window”	 in	
which	 to	 monthly	 distribute	 the	 physical	 guarantee	 and	 the	
1.	 The	thermal	power	plants	usually	sign	contracts	to	receive	an	availabil-
ity	 payment	 plus	 an	 additional	 remuneration	 for	 each	MWh	effective	
produced.
contracted	 energy.	The	 centralised	dispatch	 is	 carried	 out	 by	
the	ISO	without	considering	the	signed	contracts,	and	genera-
tors	are	not	allowed	to	decide	their	own	generation	in	order	to	
uphold	their	contracts.	On	balance,	in	day-ahead	and	intraday	
markets,	players	are	more	active	in	the	definition	of	the	merit	
order	on	a	day-by-day	basis,	and	so	they	have	more	opportuni-
ties	to	cover	the	positions	they	committed	to,	in	bilateral	con-
tracts.
Problem 2
Unlike	other	markets,	the	Brazilian	short-term	market	is	not	a	
marketplace	where	generators	are	active	through	a	self-dispatch	
procedure,	or	where	generators	influence	the	dispatch	through	
their	bids.	Ultimately,	 this	 short-term	market	 is	not	 an	 envi-
ronment	where	market	participants	can	engage	in	short-term	
trades	on	their	own	account,	as	there	is	no	short-term	declara-
tion	 of	 intent.	Moreover,	 the	 price	 that	 values	 these	 transac-
tions	 is	not	a	result	of	 the	 interaction	of	market	participants,	
but	from	the	application	of	a	chain	of	software	models,	that	are	
operated	by	a	third	party.	So,	rather	than	being	a	market,	the	
MCP	is	a	mechanism	to	settle	differences	between	the	amount	
of	electricity	committed	by	contracts	and	the	amount	of	elec-
tricity	that	each	agent	ends	up	providing	/	receiving.
Problem 3
The	 codes	 associated	with	 the	 software	 package	 used	 to	 run	
the	centralised	dispatch	are	under	intellectual	property	rights.	
Eventual	 inconsistencies	 in	 these	 algorithms	 have	 a	 huge	
impact	 within	 the	 entire	 sector,	 and	 the	 confidence	 of	 the	
market	can	be	affected.	Unfortunately,	during	2007	and	2011,	
relevant	 problems	 related	 to	 inconsistencies	 in	 these	models	
were	detected	and	a	new	version	of	the	software	was	launched.
Figure	1.	Traded	energy	in	MCP:	negative	exposition
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Dilemmas
A	 solution	 typically	 adopted	 in	 other	 countries	 and	 geo-
graphical	areas	is	the	employment	of	a	more	market-	oriented	
approach.	This	could	enable	all	generators	to	submit	quantity	
and	price	bids	in	the	short-term,	which	would	be	used	to	settle	
the	market	positions.	Nevertheless,	 there	are	 some	dilemmas	
that	must	 be	 faced,	 especially	 if	 considering	 a	 power	 system	
with	a	large	share	of	hydros.
Efficiency of energy resources
Putting	into	perspective	the	dichotomy	between	a	centralised	
dispatch	(based	on	hierarchy)	and	a	decentralised	one	(based	
on	a	market	approach),	it	becomes	clear	how	important	it	is	to	
coordinate	the	use	of	water	stored	in	the	reservoirs,	in	order	to	
safeguard	 the	 efficiency	of	 using	 the	 energy	 resources,	 i.e.	 to	
take	advantage	of	the	all	potential	energy	stored	in	the	cascade.
A	 decentralised	 dispatch,	 e.g.	 a	 scheme	 of	 bids	 in	 a	 market	
pool,	can	essentially	be	an	instantaneous	process	and	the	inter-
temporal	features	of	river	chain	operations	cannot	be	entirely	
represented,	 if	 a	 pure	 single-period	 market	 clearing	 mecha-
nism	is	adopted.	Moreover,	the	presence	of	several	owners	of	
the	hydro	cascades,	as	is	the	case	in	Brazil,	endorses	a	market	
design	based	on	a	centralised	dispatch.
Security of supply
Concerning	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 market	 to	 ensure	 sufficient	
capacity	 to	meet	 future	 demand,	 it	must	 be	 noted	 that	 gen-
erators	will	only	 invest	 in	new	power	plants	 if	 they	expect	 to	
recover	 their	 total	 costs.	Thus,	 considering	 a	 Brazilian	 elec-
tricity	market	 entirely	 reliant	 upon	 a	 short-term	market,	 the	
following	 question	 arises:	 Will	 the	 response	 of	 generators	
regarding	 the	 short-term	market	 prices	 come	 in	 the	 form	of	
new	installed	capacity?
The	Brazilian	short-term	market	has	been	in	existence	for	about	
fifteen	years.	For	the	time	being,	the	PLD	has	an	average	value	
of	37.72	€/MWh2,	and	the	successful	hydro	average	price	bid	
that	came	from	public	auctions	is	38.16	€/MWh3.	Nevertheless,	
it	should	be	noted	that	Brazil	endured	two	large	energy	crises	
(2001-2002	and	2013-2014),	that	caused	the	PLD	to	remain	at	
extreme	levels	for	long	periods,	which	were	not	expected	in	a	
country	that	traditionally	produces	electricity	based	on	hydro-
power.
2.	 Values	were	converted	from	Brazilian	Reais	(R$)	to	EUR	(€)	considering	
the	 currency	 exchange	 rate	 on	 September	 4th,	 2014	 (1€	=	R$	 2.8899).	
Available	at:	http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/conversao.asp.
3.	 CCEE	-	Electric	Power	Commercialization	Chamber.	Prices.	Available	
at:	http://www.ccee.org.br.
Regardless,	 supposing	 that	 from	 now	 on	 more	 thermal	 sta-
tions	are	included	in	the	dispatch	and	thus,	the	PLD	would	be	
greater,	 the	question	is	will	 the	PLD	curve	shape	be	a	barrier	
to	new	investment?	The	PLD	standard	deviation	of	the	entire	
set	of	data	is	around	55.36	€/MWh.	With	an	average	of	37.72	
€/MWh,	 this	 standard	 deviation	 imposes	 a	 huge	 risk	 to	 the	
health	of	the	business,	especially	regarding	the	stability	of	the	
cash	flow.
Finally,	 it	 is	 recognised	 that	 a	 capacity	mechanism	 is	needed	
in	order	to	provide	enough	incentives	to	ensure	the	security	of	
supply.	Nowadays,	this	concern	is	addressed	via	both	the	con-
tracting	 scheme	where	 the	demand	must	 be	 fully	 contracted	
ex-ante	and	contracts	physically	backed,	and	the	ISO	dispatch,	
either	through	the	mechanism	of	risk	aversion	in	the	software	
package,	 or	 through	 a	 dispatch	 according	 to	 the	merit	 order	
authorised	by	CMSE,	the	entity	that	monitors	the	supply	ade-
quacy	in	the	country.
Flexibility to comply with contracts
There	is	one	unique	“window”	in	which	to	define	the	physical	
guarantee	that	will	uphold	the	contracts.	Moreover,	generators	
operate	their	power	plants	simply	following	the	rate	of	produc-
tion	 defined	 by	 the	 ISO,	 and	 the	MRE	 is	 automatically	 per-
formed,	which	imposes	a	kind	of	“strait	jacket”	on	the	market	
participants.
Every	 time	 that	 the	PLD	 is	 high,	 there	 are	more	 dispatched	
thermal	 stations	 and	 less	 hydro	 stations.	 Depending	 on	 the	
quantity	 of	 the	 thermal	dispatch,	 hydros	 can	be	displaced	 in	
such	a	way	that	MRE	will	not	have	extra	energy	to	be	shared	
among	its	participants.	When	this	occurs,	an	adjustment	factor	
is	applied	to	withdraw	a	fraction	from	the	seasonalised	physical	
guarantee	of	the	participants.	Extending	this	reasoning	to	water	
scarcity	 periods,	 this	 represents	 a	 widespread	 negative	 posi-
tion	for	hydros.	In	conclusion,	the	MRE	is	not	able	to	cover	the	
risk	of	generators	that	have	to	buy	electricity	in	the	short-term	
market	to	complete	the	energy	committed	in	their	contracts.	
Unfortunately,	 Brazil	 is	 currently	 facing	 a	 similar	 situation.	
Due	to	an	unusual	rainfall	cycle	that	has	lasted	since	2012,	the	
power	system	has	a	widespread	water	shortage,	a	large	thermal	
dispatch	and	sky-rocketing	short-term	market	prices.	For	this	
reason,	hydros	appealed	to	the	Federal	Government	for	finan-
cial	 support.	The	Federal	Government	has	been	arguing	 that	
this	is	a	business	risk	of	hydros,	and	that	it	does	not	intend	to	
relieve	 them.	 In	 the	 long-	 term,	 and	pragmatically	 speaking,	
within	this	conjuncture	the	question	to	be	answered	is	as	fol-
lows:	for	how	long	can	this	negative	exposition	be	internalised	
by	hydro	companies?
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The proposed market design
The	Brazilian	market	design	is	lacking	a	level	of	flexibility	that	
would	allow	hydro	companies	to	adequately	manage	this	risk.	
Focused	 on	 improving	 flexibility	 for	 market	 participants	 to	
comply	with	 their	 contracts,	while	 still	 ensuring	 the	 efficient	
use	of	 energy	 resources	 and	maintaining	 the	 current	 level	 of	
the	security	of	supply,	a	new	market	design	was	developed,	sup-
ported	by	the	following	proposed	virtual	reservoir	model:
•	 Each	cascade	of	hydro	stations	operates	as	an	equivalent	res-
ervoir;
•	 Each	agent	has	a	virtual	account	that	represents	how	much	
energy	is	virtually	stored	in	his	hydropower	plant;
•	 For	each	period,	each	account	is	fed	by	a	fraction	of	the	total	
affluent	energy	of	the	equivalent	reservoir,	proportional	to	
the	hydro’s	physical	guarantee.
Then,	the	following	sequence	of	events	should	be	adopted:
1.	 The	system	operator	continues	his	work	as	it	is	currently	
done,	and	defines	the	amount	of	generation	for	each	power	
plant.	So,	the	efficiency	of	the	use	of	the	energy	resources	
and	 the	 security	of	 supply	are	maintained	at	 the	 current	
levels;
Figure	2.	Decision	making	process
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2.	 The	 “remaining	 demand”	 is	 obtained	 for	 each	 dispatch	
period.	This	demand	is	equal	to	the	total	demand	minus	
the	total	dispatch	allocated	to	the	thermal	power	plants;
3.	 A	hydro	short-term	market	is	established	based	on	bids	for	
this	remaining	demand:
a.	 Regarding	the	price	bid:	hydros	can	bid	a	price	between	
zero	and	a	regulatory	ceiling	price	defined	by	the	regu-
latory	agency;
b.	 Regarding	 the	 quantity	 bid:	 each	 agent	 can	 offer	 any	
value	within	the	balance	of	his	account;
4.	 The	 final	 short-term	 market	 price	 is	 calculated	 as	 a	
weighted	 average	 considering	 the	 hydro	 short-term	
market	price	that	comes	from	the	hydro	virtual	short-term	
market	 and	 the	 variable	 cost	 of	 the	 dispatched	 thermal	
power	plants,	and	other	energy	sources.
Through	this	market	design,	two	worlds	would	coexist:	the	real	
one,	associated	with	the	power	system	considering	the	physical	
operation	of	the	system;	and	the	virtual	one,	related	to	the	set-
tlement	system	and	with	commercial	purposes.	Thus,	the	ISO	
will	freely	operate	the	physical	system,	while	agents	would	be	
responsible	for	deciding,	in	commercial	terms,	how	much	they	
want	 to	withdraw	 from	 their	 virtual	 reservoirs	 to	meet	 their	
contracts.	To	do	that,	their	bids	have	to	be	accepted	in	an	auc-
tion	 that	will	 be	performed	as	 a	day-ahead	market.	 In	doing	
so,	each	generator	has	the	opportunity	to	manage	his	contracts	
more	 efficiently,	 without	 affecting	 the	 real	 operation	 of	 the	
physical	system.
Furthermore,	 this	model	 promotes	 a	monitoring	 of	 the	 ISO	
performance,	 based	 on	 comparisons	 between	 his	 decisions	
(the	physical	world)	and	the	market	participant	decisions	(vir-
tual	world).	To	illustrate	this	issue,	Figure	2	presents	a	scheme	
regarding	 the	 decision-	 making	 process	 in	 this	 new	 market	
design.
At	 the	 end	 of	 this	 process,	 prices	 no	 longer	 primarily	 result	
from	a	package	of	computational	models	that	may	eventually	
present	problems	related	to	inconsistencies	and	transparency,	
but	can	be	obtained	through	the	combination	of	thermal	costs	
based	on	the	ISO	dispatch	and	short-term	market	prices	arising	
from	the	hydro	short-term	market.
Thereby,	this	market	design	maintains	the	same	levels	of	effi-
ciency	and	security,	while	increasing	the	level	of	flexibility	for	
agents.	This	flexibility	can	be	achieved	by	replacing	 the	MRE	
and	the	seasonalisation	process	by	virtual	reservoir	models.	As	
a	result,	the	management	of	(virtual)	reservoirs	is	the	responsi-
bility	of	each	hydro,	which	could	save	(virtual)	water	according	
to	their	own	risk	perceptions	and,	in	doing	so,	the	operation	of	
the	physical	system	is	not	affected.
